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Extended Abstract
One of the objectives in distributed interacting multi-player systems is to enable a collection of diﬀerent
players to achieve a desirable objective. There are two overriding challenges to achieving this objective:
The ﬁrst one is related to the complexity of ﬁnding optimal solution. A centralized algorithm may be pro-
hibitively complex when there are large number of interacting players. This motivates the use of adaptive
methods that enable players to self-organize into suitable, if not optimal, alternative solutions.
The second challenge is limited information. Players may have limited knowledge about the status of other
players, except perhaps for a small subset of neighboring players. The limitations in term of information induce
robust stochastic optimization, bounded rationality and inconsistent beliefs.
In this work, we investigate asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of large-scale dynamic robust games under various
COmbined fully DIstributed PAyoﬀ and Strategy Reinforcement Learning (CODIPAS-RL [4, 5]). We consider
the following problem:
8j 2 N ; ROPj : sup
xj2Xj
EwUj(w;xj ;x j) (1)
where N is the set of players, Xj is a subset of a ﬁnite dimensional space, x j = (xj0)j0 6=j ; w is a random variable
with law :
The main issue here is that the mathematical structure of the payoﬀ function Uj : W 
Q
j02N Xj0  ! R
is not known by player j: We develop a combined distributed strategic learning in order to learn both expected
payoﬀ function as well as the associated optimal strategies. The dynamic game is played as follows:
Time is slotted. We start at some initial state w0: At each time slot t, the state wt is drawn according to
its distribution. Each player chooses an action according to some strategy. Each player is able to observe a
measurement of its payoﬀ. Based on the recent measurement, each player updates its strategy and its payoﬀ
estimations. The game goes to the next time slot.
Here, the term dynamic refers to the time/information dependence and the term robust game refers game
under uncertainty. A strategy update of the player is mainly dictated by its learning scheme. We assume each
player can choose among a ﬁnite set L of diﬀerent CODIPAS-RLs. The hybrid learning has the following form:
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sj 2 Aj ; j 2 N ; t  0
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where uj;t a noisy payoﬀ observed by player j at time t; Aj is a set with the same size as the dimension of Xj ;
L is a ﬁnite set of learning patterns, lj;t is the learning pattern chosen of player j at time t; aj;t is the action
chosen by player j at time t; sj denotes a generic element of Aj ; the real-numbers j;t and j;t are respectively
strategy-learning rate and payoﬀ-learning rate. The vector u^j;t is the estimated payoﬀs of player j corresponding
to each component. For each l 2 L; the function f (l) is well-chosen in order to guarantee the almost sure forward
invariance of
Q
j Xj by the stochastic process fxtgt0:
Assuming that (i) the functions Uj(:;x) are integrable with respect to :, (ii) Xj is convex, non-empty,
compact, (iii) each component of the hybrid CODIPAS-RL learning scheme can be written in the form of Robbins-
Monro [1] or Kiefer-Wolfowitz [2], we examine the long-run behavior the interacting system. The convergence,
non-convergence, stability/instability properties of the resulting dynamics as well as their connections to diﬀerent
solution concepts (equilibria, global optima, satisfactory solutions, hierarchical solutions) are discussed. Those
include Lyapunov expected robust games, expected robust pseudo-potential games, S-modular expected robust
games, games with monotone expected payoﬀs, aggregative robust games, risk-sensitive robust pseudo-potential
games.
A particular case of interest of our work is when the size of the system goes to inﬁnity i.e. jN j  ! +1:
Under technical assumptions on indistinguishability per class [3] of learning property, we derive a Fokker-Planck-
Kolmorogorov equation associated the hybrid CODIPAS-RL with large population of players called mean ﬁeld
learning. To prove this statement, we follow the following steps:
 Derivation of the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of the stochastic processes xj;t:
 Identiﬁcation of ordinary diﬀerential equations or Itô’s SDE approximation via multiple time-scale stochas-
tic approximations
 Time-scaling and classiﬁcation of payoﬀ functions in diﬀerent classes.
 Derivation of the law of the empirical measure over the strategies and its associated interdependent systems
of partial diﬀerential equations.
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